It burns his raiment, (yet) he says, ‘There is no fire’; it (the thread) stitches his raiment, (yet) he says, ‘There is no thread.’
پس تسفسط آمد این دعوی جبر ** لاجرم بدتر بود زین رو ز گبر 3015
Hence this doctrine of Necessity is Sophisticism (Scepticism): consequently he (the Necessitarian), from this point of view, is worse than the infidel (believer in absolute Free-will).
گبر گوید هست عالم نیست رب ** یا ربی گوید که نبود مستحب
The infidel says, ‘The world exists, (but) there is no Lord’: he says that (the invocation) ‘O my Lord!’ is not to be approved.
این همی گوید جهان خود نیست هیچ ** هسته سوفسطایی اندر پیچ پیچ
This one (the Necessitarian) says, ‘The world is really naught’: the Sophist (Sceptic) is in a tangle (of error).
جمله‌ی عالم مقر در اختیار ** امر و نهی این میار و آن بیار
The whole world acknowledges (the reality of) the power of choice: (the proof is) their commanding and forbidding (each other)—‘Bring this and do not bring that!’
او همی گوید که امر و نهی لاست ** اختیاری نیست این جمله خطاست
He (the Necessitarian) says that commanding and forbidding are naught and that there is no power of choice. All this (doctrine) is erroneous.
حس را حیوان مقرست ای رفیق ** لیک ادراک دلیل آمد دقیق 3020
Animals (too) acknowledge (the reality of) the (inward) sense, O comrade, but it is a subtle (difficult) matter to apprehend the proof (of this).
زانک محسوسست ما را اختیار ** خوب می‌آید برو تکلیف کار
Inasmuch as (the reality of) our power of choice is perceived by the (inward) sense, responsibility for actions may well be laid upon it.
درک وجدانی چون اختیار و اضطرار و خشم و اصطبار و سیری و ناهار به جای حس است کی زرد از سرخ بداند و فرق کند و خرد از بزرگ و طلخ از شیرین و مشک از سرگین و درشت از نرم به حس مس و گرم از سرد و سوزان از شیر گرم و تر از خشک و مس دیوار از مس درخت پس منکر وجدانی منکر حس باشد و زیاده که وجدانی از حس ظاهرترست زیرا حس را توان بستن و منع کردن از احساس و بستن راه و مدخل وجدانیات را ممکن نیست و العاقل تکفیه الاشارة
The inward consciousness of having the power to choose or of acting under compulsion, of anger or self-restraint, of repletion or hunger, corresponds to the senses that know and distinguish yellow from red and small from great and bitter from sweet and musk from dung and hard from soft—by the sense of touch—and hot from cold and burning (hot) from lukewarm and wet from dry and contact with a wall from contact with a tree. Therefore he who denies inward consciousness denies the senses, and (he does) more (than that), (for) inward consciousness is more evident than the senses, inasmuch as one can bind the senses and prevent them from functioning, while it is impossible to bar the way to the experiences of inward consciousness and stop their entrance. And an indication is enough for the wise.
درک وجدانی به جای حس بود ** هر دو در یک جدول ای عم می‌رود
Inward consciousness corresponds to (external) sensation: both run in the same channel, O uncle.