Does any reasonable man strike a brickbat? Does any one reprove a stone?
هیچ عاقل مر کلوخی را زند ** هیچ با سنگی عتابی کس کند
In (the eyes of) reason, Necessitarianism (jabr) is more shameful than the doctrine of (absolute) Free-will (qadar), because the Necessitarian is denying his own (inward) sense.
در خرد جبر از قدر رسواترست ** زانک جبری حس خود را منکرست
The man who holds the doctrine of (absolute) Free-will does not deny his (inward) sense: (he says), ‘The action of God is not mediated by the senses, O son.’3010
منکر حس نیست آن مرد قدر ** فعل حق حسی نباشد ای پسر
He who denies the action of the Almighty Lord is (virtually) denying Him who is indicated by the indication.
منکر فعل خداوند جلیل ** هست در انکار مدلول دلیل
That one (the believer in absolute Free-will) says, ‘There is smoke, but no fire; there is candle-light without any resplendent candle’;
آن بگوید دود هست و نار نی ** نور شمعی بی ز شمعی روشنی
And this one (the Necessitarian) sees the fire plainly, (but) for the sake of denial he says it does not exist.
وین همیبیند معین نار را ** نیست میگوید پی انکار را
It burns his raiment, (yet) he says, ‘There is no fire’; it (the thread) stitches his raiment, (yet) he says, ‘There is no thread.’
Hence this doctrine of Necessity is Sophisticism (Scepticism): consequently he (the Necessitarian), from this point of view, is worse than the infidel (believer in absolute Free-will).3015
پس تسفسط آمد این دعوی جبر ** لاجرم بدتر بود زین رو ز گبر
The infidel says, ‘The world exists, (but) there is no Lord’: he says that (the invocation) ‘O my Lord!’ is not to be approved.
گبر گوید هست عالم نیست رب ** یا ربی گوید که نبود مستحب
This one (the Necessitarian) says, ‘The world is really naught’: the Sophist (Sceptic) is in a tangle (of error).
این همی گوید جهان خود نیست هیچ ** هسته سوفسطایی اندر پیچ پیچ
The whole world acknowledges (the reality of) the power of choice: (the proof is) their commanding and forbidding (each other)—‘Bring this and do not bring that!’
جملهی عالم مقر در اختیار ** امر و نهی این میار و آن بیار
He (the Necessitarian) says that commanding and forbidding are naught and that there is no power of choice. All this (doctrine) is erroneous.
او همی گوید که امر و نهی لاست ** اختیاری نیست این جمله خطاست
Animals (too) acknowledge (the reality of) the (inward) sense, O comrade, but it is a subtle (difficult) matter to apprehend the proof (of this).3020
حس را حیوان مقرست ای رفیق ** لیک ادراک دلیل آمد دقیق
Inasmuch as (the reality of) our power of choice is perceived by the (inward) sense, responsibility for actions may well be laid upon it.
زانک محسوسست ما را اختیار ** خوب میآید برو تکلیف کار
The inward consciousness of having the power to choose or of acting under compulsion, of anger or self-restraint, of repletion or hunger, corresponds to the senses that know and distinguish yellow from red and small from great and bitter from sweet and musk from dung and hard from soft—by the sense of touch—and hot from cold and burning (hot) from lukewarm and wet from dry and contact with a wall from contact with a tree. Therefore he who denies inward consciousness denies the senses, and (he does) more (than that), (for) inward consciousness is more evident than the senses, inasmuch as one can bind the senses and prevent them from functioning, while it is impossible to bar the way to the experiences of inward consciousness and stop their entrance. And an indication is enough for the wise.
درک وجدانی چون اختیار و اضطرار و خشم و اصطبار و سیری و ناهار به جای حس است کی زرد از سرخ بداند و فرق کند و خرد از بزرگ و طلخ از شیرین و مشک از سرگین و درشت از نرم به حس مس و گرم از سرد و سوزان از شیر گرم و تر از خشک و مس دیوار از مس درخت پس منکر وجدانی منکر حس باشد و زیاده که وجدانی از حس ظاهرترست زیرا حس را توان بستن و منع کردن از احساس و بستن راه و مدخل وجدانیات را ممکن نیست و العاقل تکفیه الاشارة
Inward consciousness corresponds to (external) sensation: both run in the same channel, O uncle.
درک وجدانی به جای حس بود ** هر دو در یک جدول ای عم میرود
‘Do’ or ‘don't,’ command and prohibition, discussions and talk are suitable to it (the inward consciousness).
نغز میآید برو کن یا مکن ** امر و نهی و ماجراها و سخن
(The thought), ‘To-morrow I will do this or I will do that,’ is a proof of the power to choose, O worshipful one;
این که فردا این کنم یا آن کنم ** این دلیل اختیارست ای صنم
And (in the case of) the penitence which you have felt for (having committed) an evil deed, you have been led (into the right path) through your power of choice.3025
وان پشیمانی که خوردی زان بدی ** ز اختیار خویش گشتی مهتدی
The entire Qur’án consists of commands and prohibitions and threats (of punishment): who (ever) saw commands given to a marble rock?
جمله قران امر و نهیست و وعید ** امر کردن سنگ مرمر را کی دید
Does any wise man, does any reasonable man, do this? Does he show anger and enmity to brickbats and stones?—
هیچ دانا هیچ عاقل این کند ** با کلوخ و سنگ خشم و کین کند
Saying, ‘I told you to do thus or thus: why have ye not done it, O dead and helpless ones?’
که بگفتم کین چنین کن یا چنان ** چون نکردید ای موات و عاجزان
How should reason exercise any authority over wood and stone? How should reason lay hold of the painted figure of a cripple,
عقل کی حکمی کند بر چوب و سنگ ** عقل کی چنگی زند بر نقش چنگ
Saying, ‘O slave with palsied hands and broken legs, take up the lance and come to battle’?3030
کای غلام بسته دست اشکستهپا ** نیزه برگیر و بیا سوی وغا
How, (then), should the Creator who is the Maker of stars and sky make commands and prohibitions like those of an ignorant person?
خالقی که اختر و گردون کند ** امر و نهی جاهلانه چون کند
You have removed from God the possibility of impotence, (but) you have (virtually) called Him ignorant and stupid and foolish.
احتمال عجز از حق راندی ** جاهل و گیج و سفیهش خواندی