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5
2999-3048

  • Now look on us and them in clear view, and recognise (each party) by voice and speech.’
  • If you hear a secret from a friend at midnight, you will know that it was he when he speaks (to you again) at dawn; 3000
  • And if two persons bring news to you in the night, you will recognise both of them in the daytime by their (manner of) speaking.
  • (If) during the night the sound of a lion and the sound of a dog have come (into some one's ear) and he has not seen their forms on account of the darkness,
  • When day breaks and they begin to make (the same) sound again, the intelligent (hearer) will know them by the sound (which they make).
  • The upshot is this, that both the Devil and the (angelic) Spirit who present (objects of desire to us) exist for the purpose of completing (actualising) the power of choice.
  • There is an invisible power of choice within us; when it sees two (alternative) objects of desire it waxes strong. 3005
  • Teachers beat (school-)children: how should they inflict that correction upon a black stone?
  • Do you ever say to a stone, ‘Come to-morrow; and if you don't come, I will give your bad behaviour the punishment it deserves’?
  • Does any reasonable man strike a brickbat? Does any one reprove a stone?
  • In (the eyes of) reason, Necessitarianism (jabr) is more shameful than the doctrine of (absolute) Free-will (qadar), because the Necessitarian is denying his own (inward) sense.
  • The man who holds the doctrine of (absolute) Free-will does not deny his (inward) sense: (he says), ‘The action of God is not mediated by the senses, O son.’ 3010
  • He who denies the action of the Almighty Lord is (virtually) denying Him who is indicated by the indication.
  • That one (the believer in absolute Free-will) says, ‘There is smoke, but no fire; there is candle-light without any resplendent candle’;
  • And this one (the Necessitarian) sees the fire plainly, (but) for the sake of denial he says it does not exist.
  • It burns his raiment, (yet) he says, ‘There is no fire’; it (the thread) stitches his raiment, (yet) he says, ‘There is no thread.’
  • Hence this doctrine of Necessity is Sophisticism (Scepticism): consequently he (the Necessitarian), from this point of view, is worse than the infidel (believer in absolute Free-will). 3015
  • The infidel says, ‘The world exists, (but) there is no Lord’: he says that (the invocation) ‘O my Lord!’ is not to be approved.
  • This one (the Necessitarian) says, ‘The world is really naught’: the Sophist (Sceptic) is in a tangle (of error).
  • The whole world acknowledges (the reality of) the power of choice: (the proof is) their commanding and forbidding (each other)—‘Bring this and do not bring that!’
  • He (the Necessitarian) says that commanding and forbidding are naught and that there is no power of choice. All this (doctrine) is erroneous.
  • Animals (too) acknowledge (the reality of) the (inward) sense, O comrade, but it is a subtle (difficult) matter to apprehend the proof (of this). 3020
  • Inasmuch as (the reality of) our power of choice is perceived by the (inward) sense, responsibility for actions may well be laid upon it.
  • The inward consciousness of having the power to choose or of acting under compulsion, of anger or self-restraint, of repletion or hunger, corresponds to the senses that know and distinguish yellow from red and small from great and bitter from sweet and musk from dung and hard from soft—by the sense of touch—and hot from cold and burning (hot) from lukewarm and wet from dry and contact with a wall from contact with a tree. Therefore he who denies inward consciousness denies the senses, and (he does) more (than that), (for) inward consciousness is more evident than the senses, inasmuch as one can bind the senses and prevent them from functioning, while it is impossible to bar the way to the experiences of inward consciousness and stop their entrance. And an indication is enough for the wise.
  • Inward consciousness corresponds to (external) sensation: both run in the same channel, O uncle.
  • ‘Do’ or ‘don't,’ command and prohibition, discussions and talk are suitable to it (the inward consciousness).
  • (The thought), ‘To-morrow I will do this or I will do that,’ is a proof of the power to choose, O worshipful one;
  • And (in the case of) the penitence which you have felt for (having committed) an evil deed, you have been led (into the right path) through your power of choice. 3025
  • The entire Qur’án consists of commands and prohibitions and threats (of punishment): who (ever) saw commands given to a marble rock?
  • Does any wise man, does any reasonable man, do this? Does he show anger and enmity to brickbats and stones?—
  • Saying, ‘I told you to do thus or thus: why have ye not done it, O dead and helpless ones?’
  • How should reason exercise any authority over wood and stone? How should reason lay hold of the painted figure of a cripple,
  • Saying, ‘O slave with palsied hands and broken legs, take up the lance and come to battle’? 3030
  • How, (then), should the Creator who is the Maker of stars and sky make commands and prohibitions like those of an ignorant person?
  • You have removed from God the possibility of impotence, (but) you have (virtually) called Him ignorant and stupid and foolish.
  • (Divine) impotence does not follow from the doctrine of Free-will; and even if it do, ignorance is worse than impotence.
  • The Turcoman says graciously to the stranger-guest, ‘Come to my door without a dog and without a tattered cloak,
  • And hark, come in respectfully from such and such a quarter, in order that my dog may keep his teeth and mouth closed (and refrain) from (biting) thee.’ 3035
  • (But) you do the reverse of that and advance to the door: necessarily you are wounded by the violence of the dog.
  • (You must) advance in the same manner in which slaves have advanced, so that his dog may become gentle and affectionate.
  • (If) you take a dog or a fox with you, a dog will rage (at you) from the bottom of every tent.
  • If none but God have the power of choice, why do you become angry with one who has committed an offence (against you)?
  • Why do you gnash your teeth at a foe? Why do you regard the sin and offence as (proceeding) from him? 3040
  • If a piece of timber break off from your house-roof and fall upon you and wound you severely,
  • Will you feel any anger against the timber of the roof? Will you ever devote yourself to taking vengeance upon it,
  • (And say), ‘Why did it hit me and fracture my hand? It has been my mortal foe and enemy’?
  • Why do you beat little children (when they do wrong), since (in theory) you make out that adults are exempt from blame?
  • (In the case of) a man who steals your property, you say (to the magistrate), ‘Arrest him, cut off his hand and foot, make him a captive’; 3045
  • And (in the case of) a man who visits your wife, a hundred thousand angers shoot up from you.
  • (On the contrary), if a flood come and sweep away your household goods, will your reason bear any enmity towards the flood?
  • And if the wind came and carried off your turban, when did your heart show any anger against the wind?