نیم شب چون بشنوی رازی ز دوست ** چون سخن گوید سحر دانی که اوست 3000
If you hear a secret from a friend at midnight, you will know that it was he when he speaks (to you again) at dawn;
ور دو کس در شب خبر آرد ترا ** روز از گفتن شناسی هر دو را
And if two persons bring news to you in the night, you will recognise both of them in the daytime by their (manner of) speaking.
بانگ شیر و بانگ سگ در شب رسید ** صورت هر دو ز تاریکی ندید
(If) during the night the sound of a lion and the sound of a dog have come (into some one's ear) and he has not seen their forms on account of the darkness,
روز شد چون باز در بانگ آمدند ** پس شناسدشان ز بانگ آن هوشمند
When day breaks and they begin to make (the same) sound again, the intelligent (hearer) will know them by the sound (which they make).
مخلص این که دیو و روح عرضه‌دار ** هر دو هستند از تتمه‌ی اختیار
The upshot is this, that both the Devil and the (angelic) Spirit who present (objects of desire to us) exist for the purpose of completing (actualising) the power of choice.
اختیاری هست در ما ناپدید ** چون دو مطلب دید آید در مزید 3005
There is an invisible power of choice within us; when it sees two (alternative) objects of desire it waxes strong.
اوستادان کودکان را می‌زنند ** آن ادب سنگ سیه را کی کنند
Teachers beat (school-)children: how should they inflict that correction upon a black stone?
هیچ گویی سنگ را فردا بیا ** ور نیایی من دهم بد را سزا
Do you ever say to a stone, ‘Come to-morrow; and if you don't come, I will give your bad behaviour the punishment it deserves’?
هیچ عاقل مر کلوخی را زند ** هیچ با سنگی عتابی کس کند
Does any reasonable man strike a brickbat? Does any one reprove a stone?
در خرد جبر از قدر رسواترست ** زانک جبری حس خود را منکرست
In (the eyes of) reason, Necessitarianism (jabr) is more shameful than the doctrine of (absolute) Free-will (qadar), because the Necessitarian is denying his own (inward) sense.
منکر حس نیست آن مرد قدر ** فعل حق حسی نباشد ای پسر 3010
The man who holds the doctrine of (absolute) Free-will does not deny his (inward) sense: (he says), ‘The action of God is not mediated by the senses, O son.’
منکر فعل خداوند جلیل ** هست در انکار مدلول دلیل
He who denies the action of the Almighty Lord is (virtually) denying Him who is indicated by the indication.
آن بگوید دود هست و نار نی ** نور شمعی بی ز شمعی روشنی
That one (the believer in absolute Free-will) says, ‘There is smoke, but no fire; there is candle-light without any resplendent candle’;
وین همی‌بیند معین نار را ** نیست می‌گوید پی انکار را
And this one (the Necessitarian) sees the fire plainly, (but) for the sake of denial he says it does not exist.
It burns his raiment, (yet) he says, ‘There is no fire’; it (the thread) stitches his raiment, (yet) he says, ‘There is no thread.’
پس تسفسط آمد این دعوی جبر ** لاجرم بدتر بود زین رو ز گبر 3015
Hence this doctrine of Necessity is Sophisticism (Scepticism): consequently he (the Necessitarian), from this point of view, is worse than the infidel (believer in absolute Free-will).
گبر گوید هست عالم نیست رب ** یا ربی گوید که نبود مستحب
The infidel says, ‘The world exists, (but) there is no Lord’: he says that (the invocation) ‘O my Lord!’ is not to be approved.
این همی گوید جهان خود نیست هیچ ** هسته سوفسطایی اندر پیچ پیچ
This one (the Necessitarian) says, ‘The world is really naught’: the Sophist (Sceptic) is in a tangle (of error).
جمله‌ی عالم مقر در اختیار ** امر و نهی این میار و آن بیار
The whole world acknowledges (the reality of) the power of choice: (the proof is) their commanding and forbidding (each other)—‘Bring this and do not bring that!’
او همی گوید که امر و نهی لاست ** اختیاری نیست این جمله خطاست
He (the Necessitarian) says that commanding and forbidding are naught and that there is no power of choice. All this (doctrine) is erroneous.
حس را حیوان مقرست ای رفیق ** لیک ادراک دلیل آمد دقیق 3020
Animals (too) acknowledge (the reality of) the (inward) sense, O comrade, but it is a subtle (difficult) matter to apprehend the proof (of this).
زانک محسوسست ما را اختیار ** خوب می‌آید برو تکلیف کار
Inasmuch as (the reality of) our power of choice is perceived by the (inward) sense, responsibility for actions may well be laid upon it.
درک وجدانی چون اختیار و اضطرار و خشم و اصطبار و سیری و ناهار به جای حس است کی زرد از سرخ بداند و فرق کند و خرد از بزرگ و طلخ از شیرین و مشک از سرگین و درشت از نرم به حس مس و گرم از سرد و سوزان از شیر گرم و تر از خشک و مس دیوار از مس درخت پس منکر وجدانی منکر حس باشد و زیاده که وجدانی از حس ظاهرترست زیرا حس را توان بستن و منع کردن از احساس و بستن راه و مدخل وجدانیات را ممکن نیست و العاقل تکفیه الاشارة
The inward consciousness of having the power to choose or of acting under compulsion, of anger or self-restraint, of repletion or hunger, corresponds to the senses that know and distinguish yellow from red and small from great and bitter from sweet and musk from dung and hard from soft—by the sense of touch—and hot from cold and burning (hot) from lukewarm and wet from dry and contact with a wall from contact with a tree. Therefore he who denies inward consciousness denies the senses, and (he does) more (than that), (for) inward consciousness is more evident than the senses, inasmuch as one can bind the senses and prevent them from functioning, while it is impossible to bar the way to the experiences of inward consciousness and stop their entrance. And an indication is enough for the wise.
درک وجدانی به جای حس بود ** هر دو در یک جدول ای عم می‌رود
Inward consciousness corresponds to (external) sensation: both run in the same channel, O uncle.
نغز می‌آید برو کن یا مکن ** امر و نهی و ماجراها و سخن
‘Do’ or ‘don't,’ command and prohibition, discussions and talk are suitable to it (the inward consciousness).
این که فردا این کنم یا آن کنم ** این دلیل اختیارست ای صنم
(The thought), ‘To-morrow I will do this or I will do that,’ is a proof of the power to choose, O worshipful one;